Why Biden Can’t Force a Truce on Israel in Gaza—or Won’t

Having tethered himself to Israel’s war aims against Hamas, U.S. President Joe Biden now seems hostage to a prime minister who has clearly placed his own political survival above the U.S.-Israeli relationship and perhaps even the best interests of his country. Indeed, this week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu manufactured a mini-crisis in the special relationship over a U.S. abstention on a cease-fire resolution at the U.N. Security Council that reminded us of a Seinfeld-like “show about nothing.” Netanyahu blasted the administration and canceled the visit to Washington of a high-level Israeli delegation.

Having tethered himself to Israel’s war aims against Hamas, U.S. President Joe Biden now seems hostage to a prime minister who has clearly placed his own political survival above the U.S.-Israeli relationship and perhaps even the best interests of his country. Indeed, this week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu manufactured a mini-crisis in the special relationship over a U.S. abstention on a cease-fire resolution at the U.N. Security Council that reminded us of a Seinfeld-like “show about nothing.” Netanyahu blasted the administration and canceled the visit to Washington of a high-level Israeli delegation.

Biden’s patience must be wearing thin. Nearly six months into a war that seemingly has no end, the president has afforded Israel the kind of unwavering support exceeded perhaps only by former President Richard Nixon’s during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. And he’s gotten little in return. Like Howard Beale in the classic film Network, is Biden nearing his “I’m as mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this anymore” moment? Well, maybe. But here are four good reasons why Biden may be reluctant to deploy the leverage he clearly has, and why even if he did, it probably wouldn’t work.

The President’s Love Affair With Israel

Pressuring Israel just isn’t in Biden’s nature. Like Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, support for Israel is a gut issue. You can argue that presidents shouldn’t make policy based on emotional prejudgments or sentiments. But welcome to the American presidency. Presidents bring to the office their own history, sensibilities, and views imprinted over a lifetime. Biden isn’t in love with his friend Netanyahu. But he’s in love with the idea, the people, and the security of Israel. Alone among U.S. presidents, Biden considers himself part of Israel’s story with an emotional commitment reinforced by decades of interaction with Israel’s leaders and immersion in the Senate, where being good on Israel was seen as good policy and politics. If any single factor explains the president’s extraordinary support for Israel since Oct. 7, it’s that emotional bond. Indeed, Biden’s default position even in the face of the most right-wing government in Israel’s history isn’t to confront, but to accommodate; to look for ways to manage tensions and to resolve problems quietly if possible, especially when it comes to Israel’s security. Of all the pressure points Biden has available to him, the one that he’d be most reluctant to use is restricting or conditioning military assistance to Israel, let alone stopping it—particularly in a crisis where Israel is operating against Hamas in Gaza and potentially facing a major escalation with Hezbollah in the north.

Oct. 7 Changed the Equation

Whatever the stakes of the current conflict are for the United States, they are exponentially increased for Israel. And that means no matter how tough the pressure and persuasion, the Israelis are prepared to push back on those doing the pressuring and persuading. The United States has used pressure successfully on Israel even during crises. Former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened to sanction Israel in the aftermath of the 1956 Arab-Israeli War if it didn’t withdraw its forces from Sinai; and Nixon and Henry Kissinger restrained Israel from destroying Egypt’s third army to preserve the possibilities for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s postwar diplomacy in 1973. But no U.S. administration or Israeli government has faced circumstances quite like these, where for almost six months Israel has been engaged in combat operations against a terror organization that slaughtered hundreds of civilians and holds hostages. Indeed, unlike 1973, the United States isn’t mediating a conflict between two states interested in actually concluding a peace agreement. Israel is facing off against an organization that is the embodiment of an idea, and that idea is the end of Israel and its replacement by an Islamic state. Indeed, Oct. 7 was the largest terror attack in the nation’s history and the single bloodiest day for Jews since the Holocaust. The trauma inflicted by Hamas and the displacement of 200,000 Israelis from border communities have impacted the home front as no other conflict has—shattering not only Israelis’ sense of security but the normalcy of their lives as well. Any U.S. president would have to tread very carefully and pick his fights carefully when it came to exerting pressure on a public and political elite that seem determined to support the war against Hamas until they can be assured that there will be no more terror attacks. In this sense, the Hamas factor looms large. Israel isn’t at war with Switzerland. Significant pressure on Israel while Hamas promises more Oct. 7s and abuses hostages is, to say the least, untenable.

Israel’s Domestic Politics Make It Hard

If Biden were just squaring off against Netanyahu, it might be easier to envision pressing an unpopular leader who has lost the confidence of the majority of Israelis. And, indeed, Netanyahu has lost that confidence. If elections were held today most polls suggest he would be unable to form a government. But that does not mean Israelis are opposed to the prime minister’s tough policies in prosecuting the war against Hamas in Gaza, or that the political establishment is prepared to separate itself from those policies. Benny Gantz, the most likely successor to Netanyahu, still sits in the war cabinet and remains in favor of an Israeli operation in Rafah. The majority of the Israeli public is not concerned with and is not focused on the appalling humanitarian situation in Gaza. Nor are Israelis eager to accept the Biden administration’s views on the importance of a two-state solution. At least for now, Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition remains intact. Biden is immensely popular in Israel; but no Biden-Netanyahu war of words is going to convince Israelis that the prime minister is unfit for office. Netanyahu’s opposition is as fractured as ever, with politicians like Gideon Sa’ar and Avigdor Lieberman driven by their own interests, attempting to maximize their own support before calling an election.

Biden Can’t End the War Without Israel’s Cooperation

In the end, other than Biden’s emotional bond with Israel, the greatest constraint on his bringing significant pressure on Israel either to preempt an Israeli policy or impose costs on Israel for carrying one out that runs against U.S. interests is the stunningly obvious fact that Biden cannot deescalate the war in Gaza, let alone end it, without Israel’s cooperation. In very simple terms, does Biden want to make a point—or a difference? And while he’s dealing with an Israeli prime minister who may well have a stake in prolonging the war and opposing U.S. interests in the process, unless he can change the government of Israel (which he can’t), he has few good options other than to try to deal with it. He needs Israel for a hostage deal—the only pathway that offers any hope of buying a temporary cease-fire and deescalating. He needs Israel to facilitate humanitarian assistance into Gaza. (It was Israel that provided security for the recent World Central Kitchen deliveries, and it would do the same once the U.S.-constructed marine corridor opens.) He needs Israel if there’s any chance of working out a way to reconcile Israel’s planned campaign in Rafah with the need to protect Palestinians there, and he’ll need Israel for whatever post-conflict arrangements are worked out for Gaza.

It’s a fair question to pose: Would pressure on Israel advance or retard any of these goals? Biden has had at least four potential pressure points to signal his administration’s opposition to Israeli policies since the war began: slow walking, restricting military assistance, voting for or abstaining from U.N. Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, and demanding a cessation of hostilities untethered from any negotiations involving the release of hostages. On the face of it, it’s not clear that any of them would move Israel closer to cooperation or create a fracture in the current government that would lead to its replacement by one that would follow Washington’s lead. One might think that the exponential rise in Palestinian death and suffering and the humanitarian catastrophe, including the possibility of starvation and even famine, might compel the president to be more assertive. But throw in Republican opposition, with an election coming up, and it’s clear, almost six months into this war, that Biden has been opposed or reluctant to use the leverage available to him. Some have argued that the recent abstention at the United Nations was an opening shot in a more intensified pressure campaign. The administration is currently reviewing assurances from Israel that its use of U.S. military assistance isn’t in violation of international humanitarian law. We’ll see. But a preternaturally pro-Israel president facing a continuing conflict between a U.S. ally and a vicious militant organization will look long and hard before he leaps.