NFL playoffs: How Lions lost to 49ers and Chiefs beat Ravens

Sunday’s NFL conference title games were two very different sorts of games.

Chiefs-Ravens was a slow burn, as Kansas City got out to an early lead and held onto it throughout. Baltimore got closer and closer to competing as the game went along, but mistakes at the wrong time shut down its chances. One year after he was the leading receiver for the Chiefs in the AFC Championship Game, Marquez Valdes-Scantling hauled in a 32-yard bomb on third-and-9 to break the Ravens and send the Chiefs back to the Super Bowl.

Lions-49ers was a slugfest, and could also be accurately described as a rope-a-dope. Detroit dominated early and jumped out to a 17-point lead, only for San Francisco to claw its way back in the second half. In a four-minute window, the 49ers pounced. They stopped the Lions on fourth down, scored a touchdown, forced a fumble and scored again to tie the game. While Detroit threatened later in the game, another failed fourth-down try put San Francisco in the driver’s seat, sealing a Super Bowl LIV rematch against the Chiefs.

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There’s a set of questions emanating from each game that stand out as the most pressing topics of conversation Monday morning. The Ravens came into their game with the to-be-crowned MVP under center in Lamar Jackson and a dominant offense, but they were held to just 10 points. And after being lauded for his aggressiveness on fourth down all season, a pair of fourth-down failures by coach Dan Campbell and the Lions seemed to steer the game toward the 49ers.

Are those arguments factual or fictional? What happened to help swing these games? Let’s take a closer look at these stories and how they hold up under scrutiny, starting with the afternoon game and another playoff masterpiece from Chiefs defensive coordinator Steve Spagnuolo:

Jump to a matchup:
Chiefs 17, Ravens 10
49ers 34, Lions 31

How the Chiefs shut down the Ravens

The Chiefs took away so many of the things the Ravens do well on offense and limited them to attempt things that they don’t do as effectively. And then, when Baltimore did threaten, Kansas City came up with the game’s two biggest plays to take points off the board. This wasn’t a dominant performance by Andy Reid’s team, which was outgained by the Ravens, but it was a thoughtful one.

What did the Chiefs keep the Ravens from doing? And what did the Ravens do to beat themselves?

The Ravens didn’t run the ball. While they are a more pass-friendly team in neutral situations than some realize, they simply got away from running the football. I’m the last person to harp on the importance of establishing the run or committing to the ground game for the sake of racking up carries, but Baltimore was one-dimensional for most of the contest.

During the regular season, when the Ravens were facing first-and-10 while the score was still within 14 points, offensive coordinator Todd Monken called designed runs about 50.6% of the time (excluding scrambles and kneel-downs). That can include some games in which they led late and wanted to chew up clock, but I’ll throw that 50-50 marker up as a reasonable rate for how often the Ravens were willing to run the ball on first-and-10 throughout their games.

On Sunday, they ran the ball just nine times on 26 tries on first-and-10. One of those was a kneel-down, and three were Jackson scrambles on pass plays. They really called only five run plays on 22 first-and-10 situations. That’s less than half their typical run rate to start series. While acknowledging Jackson has the ability to check into and out of plays at the line of scrimmage, it certainly didn’t seem like Monken and Jackson got to the run very often.

When you look at the factors that might influence the run, it’s hard to understand why the Ravens would have avoided it as often as they did. The Chiefs ranked 26th in rush defense success rate during the regular season. They didn’t have starting linebacker Willie Gay because of a neck injury, so Kansas City spent much of the game in its sub-package with extra defensive backs on the field. Nick Bolton played every snap, and Drue Tranquill and Leo Chenal split snaps. (When the Chiefs did play their base defense, the Ravens still had snaps in which they ran the ball.) The Chiefs were willing to load the box and had a numbers advantage in terms of blocking 32.5% of the time, but Jackson shifts the numbers back toward the offense by virtue of being involved in the running game.

Instead, the Ravens seemed to panic and default to the pass. Gus Edwards had a 15-yard gain against Kansas City’s base defense in the first quarter, but that was his only carry of the first half. He had two carries the rest of the way, including one on the opening play of the second half. The Ravens gave Justice Hill nearly 70% of the offensive snaps; he had four catches for 34 yards, but his three carries produced 3 yards, and he allowed a pressure and a third-and-10 sack in pass protection. After Edwards carried the ball on the first snap of the second half, the Ravens didn’t call a designed run on first-and-10 again the rest of the game. They either threw the ball or Jackson scrambled as part of a pass play on each of the 15 ensuing first-and-10 opportunities. And while they trailed by 10 for much of that stretch, that’s not such an enormous gap to just abandon the run altogether.

The Chiefs took away the Ravens’ intermediate passing game. While Jackson isn’t always a great deep passer, he has thrived in slicing teams apart in the intermediate range. On throws between 11 and 20 yards in the air this season, his 95.9 QBR was the league’s best mark. He hit about four throws for 63 yards per game in this range during the regular season.

While Spagnuolo was clearly willing to cede underneath completions to Hill and Edwards, the Chiefs did a great job of dropping into those intermediate throwing lanes, taking away the throws Jackson usually wants to hit. He had just one completion on an intermediate pass all game, and that didn’t come until the fourth quarter, when he found Nelson Agholor for a 39-yard catch-and-run. He went 1-of-4 on intermediate throws.

The Chiefs forced Jackson to throw deep downfield; while he hit two completions to Zay Flowers, his other five deep attempts were incomplete. Going 2-for-7 isn’t a bad completion rate on those deep throws, but after a Flowers touchdown on a scramble drill, the Ravens didn’t get enough out of their other big plays.

Spagnuolo and the defense forced Jackson to hold the football. When the Ravens got going on offense in the second half against Houston last week, they were able to exploit a Texans defense leaning heavily on the blitz by getting the ball out quickly with RPOs. Having exhausted DeMeco Ryans’ front seven, they ran the ball down Houston’s throats in the fourth quarter, picking up huge chunks of yardage in the process.

A very underrated Chiefs secondary did an excellent job of plastering onto Baltimore’s receivers early in plays, which allowed them to limit the Ravens’ RPO and quick games. Within 2.5 seconds or less of the snap, Jackson was just 4-of-10 for 27 yards. He missed a couple of throws, but Kansas City did a great job against screens and quick throws.

Instead, Jackson held the ball for more than four seconds on 13 dropbacks. The last time he did that was Week 3 of the 2021 season in a 19-17 win over the Lions. He wasn’t bad on those throws (4-of-9 for 96 yards and the exquisite touchdown pass to Flowers) but he also took four sacks in those situations, one of which was a strip sack by Charles Omenihu. The Chiefs believed they could hold up against Baltimore’s receivers in coverage deep into plays, and they were right more often than not.

There were some elements of the Ravens’ loss, though, that were more about sloppy play and incredible timing than some innate element of the Chiefs’ game plan. Those plays ended up deciding a game that probably was closer than it seemed.

The Ravens blew their opportunities to score touchdowns in the fourth quarter. After a 54-yard catch by Flowers on the final drive of the third quarter got them into the red zone for the first time all game, Flowers was immediately flagged after the play for taunting L’Jarius Sneed. I’m no fan of the league’s taunting rules, but it was hard to argue he didn’t get his money’s worth in both taunting and spinning the ball next to a downed opponent.

The penalty pushed them back 15 yards. Another Flowers catch got them back into the red zone, and a third was about to get them in for a score, only for Sneed to gain a measure of revenge by punching the ball out of Flowers’ hands on the 1-yard line, with the Chiefs recovering in the end zone for a touchback. A drive that should have produced seven points resulted in nothing.

On the ensuing drive, the Ravens converted a fourth-and-3 and a third-and-2 before Jackson hit Agholor for a 39-yard completion, setting them up on the Kansas City 25-yard line. Two plays later, Jackson got locked onto Isaiah Likely on a seam route and tried to force a pass in between three defenders, with the mass of defenders knocking Likely off his route and Deon Bush picking off Jackson’s pass. This wasn’t a red zone possession, but it was 5 yards away from becoming one, and it also produced no points.

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Zay Flowers injures hand in frustration after costly goal-line fumble

Ravens WR Zay Flowers injures his hand on the sideline in frustration after fumbling in the end zone for a Chiefs touchback.

The Ravens’ third drive of the fourth quarter also reached the Kansas City 25, only for a third-down hold on Likely to go uncalled, forcing them to settle for a field goal. The Ravens were the No. 6 offense in the league by expected points added (EPA) per play within 25 yards of the end zone and the No. 8 red zone offense during the regular season. They turned these three drives into three points, and that cost them any chance of catching up to the Chiefs.

The Ravens made too many mental mistakes. This wasn’t the sort of performance Baltimore will feel good about putting on film as it approaches a long offseason. There were too many moments in the game when Ravens players did things that make it harder to win championships. Teams can survive them, as the Chiefs did with Mecole Hardman’s fumble through the end zone against the Bills last week, but it’s easier said than done.

Flowers’ taunting call and fumble reaching out for a touchdown obviously loom as critical mistakes from the best receiver on the roster. He reportedly then cut his hand on the bench, a move that only compounded his problems. He didn’t have a single target the rest of the way.

Flowers is a young player, but the veterans also made mistakes. Kyle Van Noy was flagged for unnecessary roughness after a play for head-butting Travis Kelce directly in front of two officials. Travis Jones was flagged later on the same drive for roughing the passer when he clotheslined Patrick Mahomes. On the final drive of the game for the Chiefs, the Ravens were flagged on the first snap of the possession for having 12 men on the field. That required Roquan Smith to commit a deliberate offside foul to get them back in a first-and-10 situation — as opposed to first-and-5, which would have given the Chiefs a chance to convert an easy first down, and thus get extra downs to run the clock. It was a smart decision for Smith to deliberately jump offside — but he didn’t need to run over a Chiefs offensive lineman in the process, earning him a 15-yard unnecessary roughness call.

And yes, if you have someone in your life who insists the Chiefs get all the calls because of these penalties, feel free to ignore them. The taunting, unnecessary roughness and roughing the passer calls were all textbook examples of eliciting calls from a crew that didn’t throw many flags all game. Likely deserved to draw a holding penalty on that late third down, but the Chiefs were denied a touchdown when Trey Smith was incorrectly flagged for holding on what should have been a screen to Rashee Rice for a 33-yard score.

Instead, the Ravens have to look back and wonder whether they wasted the best team they’ll have in the Jackson era. They’ll lose several free agents this offseason and might not get to bring back star defensive coordinator Mike Macdonald, who held Mahomes & Co. to three points and 10 first downs across their final nine drives. This was one of the healthier Baltimore teams we’ve seen deep into January, even if Mark Andrews and Marlon Humphrey were limited to a handful of snaps. With a healthy, thriving Jackson, a first-round bye and a home game in the conference championship, the Ravens were in position to make it back to the Super Bowl. Now, after a game in which they didn’t play their best football and made preventable mistakes, that all goes by the wayside for another year.

What mattered most as the Lions blew a 24-7 lead

Detroit coach Dan Campbell finally got too aggressive for his own good. Given an opportunity to restore a 17-point lead early in the third quarter against the 49ers, Campbell’s appetite for taking risks finally outweighed decades of football acumen. With a 24-10 lead, the Lions passed up a 46-yard field goal opportunity to go for it on fourth-and-2, Josh Reynolds dropped a catchable pass, and the floodgates opened. Four minutes of football later, the game was tied at 24. When Campbell passed up another chance to kick a field goal (this time to tie the game) on fourth-and-3 in the fourth quarter, he had might as well have handed the 49ers their tickets to Las Vegas. San Francisco made the stop and scored on the ensuing drive to go up 10 before a late Detroit rally came up short.

That’s the story you’ll read in some circles today. Maybe many. And if you believe the 49ers were extra motivated by their fourth-down stop or that a 17-point lead in the third quarter would have sealed the win for the Lions, well, I’ll never be able to prove otherwise. I would argue that research has shown teams aren’t any more likely to score after stopping the opposing team on fourth down as opposed to getting the ball in the same area from a punt, and I’d point out we see comebacks from 17 down in the third quarter about as often as we see comebacks from 14 down in the same situation. We can never know for sure how things might have played out if the Lions had attempted a field goal in the same spot, however.

Facing a complicated question, one way to try to gain a sense of what happened and what was actually fact or fiction for the Lions in the second half is to break down the game into a series of smaller questions.

Did analytics say the Lions should have gone for it on those fourth-down tries? ESPN’s fourth-down decision data suggests they were very slightly situations in which the Lions would have been better off going for it. The first decision in the third quarter favored going for it by 0.3%. The second, down three points in the fourth quarter, favored going for it by 0.2%.

Most people who follow analytics closely around the NFL would consider those to be toss-ups before considering the other factors that come into play. And when you get those involved …

Did the factors that models don’t capture well suggest the Lions should have gone for it? Absolutely. There’s hardly a question. The strength of the Lions is their offense, especially their offensive line and ability to overpower opposing defenses. Their weakness is their defense, particularly their pass defense. They should be more aggressive than the numbers suggest on fourth down because it aligns with the strength of their team.

On top of that, I often hear coaches and even analysts rely on what has happened earlier in games as evidence that models can’t account for situations. When Rams coach Sean McVay punted on fourth down against the Lions in the wild-card round and never saw the ball again, he referred to this as the “flow of the game,” the idea that a model can’t innately account for what has happened so far in a contest and what is likely to occur afterward.

I would argue that’s a product of the base rate fallacy, but if we want to overweigh what had happened in this game as a significant factor in evaluating what the Lions should have done in this situation, that’s even more of an argument in favor of going for it in the third quarter. Detroit had dominated throughout this game on offense, scoring points on four of its first five possessions. It was averaging more than 6.0 yards per play and had blown the 49ers off the line of scrimmage repeatedly during the contest. On their prior drive, the Lions had converted third-and-12 on the ground. Their two short-yardage snaps of the game up to this point had been David Montgomery conversions for first downs. If you dismissed what models say because they’re too aggressive when a game dictates otherwise, this is the exact sort of game and situation in which Campbell should have been more aggressive than what a model would have indicated, not less.

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Dan Campbell doesn’t regret fourth-down decisions

Lions coach Dan Campbell explains why he decided to have the Lions go for it on fourth down instead of kicking a field goal twice in the fourth quarter.

On top of all that, the Lions didn’t exactly have Justin Tucker lining up. Michael Badgley was on this team’s practice squad before taking over for the released Riley Patterson. He has gone 6-of-6 on field goal attempts, but he has missed two extra points in six games and has historically hit 82.4% of his field goals, including a 77% rate in the 40-49-yard range. If the Lions could have been assured Badgley would hit the 46-yarder, the math would have been different. Given that he misses this kick about one-quarter of the time, there’s even more of a reason to rely on the offense as opposed to a replacement-level kicker.

The Lions had been struggling more by the time the second kick rolled around, although they had successfully driven into field goal range. That kick would have been a 48-yarder, making it just slightly more difficult for Badgley. It also would have given the ball back to the 49ers in a tie game with 7:38 to go, a scenario in which Detroit might not see the ball again until September. I can understand going for it there, although I don’t think the recency factors are as strong.

What models do capture really well is how many possessions each team is likely to have over the remainder of the game and how difficult it is to overcome leads of various sizes. ESPN’s model (and other public and private fourth-down models out there) do a good job of estimating the relative scale of different-sized leads and the benefits of going up 14 vs. 17 vs. 21.

Should Campbell have been more conservative because it was the postseason? I don’t see why. He has been lauded for sticking to his aggressive principles over the entirety of his three-year tenure in Detroit, an aggressiveness that has extended to key moments and produced results. He went for it on fourth-and-goal from the 1-yard line in the second quarter against the Rams and was rewarded with a touchdown in a game that was eventually won 24-23.

Against the Bucs last week, Campbell went for it on fourth-and-goal from the 1-yard line in a tie game in the third quarter despite the fact the Lions were discombobulated on offense and had third-string back Craig Reynolds take the handoff. Reynolds wasn’t supposed to be in the game, but he plowed through the line for a score on his first carry since Halloween. Detroit won that game by eight.

Those were games in which the score was closer and the impact of failing on a fourth down was much more significant. If anything, it would be riskier to go for it and fail on fourth down. If you want to treat them as less valuable or important because they weren’t the conference championship game and were merely playoff games, that’s your prerogative, but that seems like an arbitrary distinction.

If the argument is instead that the Lions were on the road and underdogs, that’s even more of a reason to be aggressive. Playing as an underdog means teams should try to stretch advantages and be more aggressive, knowing that a conservative script and a game without many surprising events will typically favor your opponent, since it’s the better team over a broader period of time. The Lions had unquestionably played like the better team up to that third-quarter point, but they weren’t able to sustain that after the fourth-down failure.

Are other teams punished for going for it on fourth down in the playoffs? If anything, they’re rewarded more often than not. Baltimore’s only touchdown in the early game came on a drive in which it converted a fourth-and-1 deep in its own territory. Kansas City also scored on its opening drive after the game after converting a fourth-and-2 on the Baltimore side of the field.

Maybe those games were too close. What about in the 2019 playoffs, when the Texans got out to an early lead against the Chiefs? Houston held a 21-0 lead on Kansas City at the end of the first quarter and then got the ball back after a three-and-out. Facing a fourth-and-1 in the red zone, Bill O’Brien sent out his kicker to put the Texans up by 24 points, denying the Chiefs any chance at a momentum-sparking stop on downs.

The Chiefs returned the ensuing kickoff 58 yards. They scored a touchdown two plays later. The Texans went three-and-out, and on fourth down, they tried a fake punt and failed. The Chiefs scored another touchdown on their ensuing possession. Then again. After the Texans ignored what the numbers said in an obvious go-for-it situation and attempted a field goal to avoid giving the Chiefs any hope, the Chiefs proceeded to do exactly what the Texans were hoping to avoid. They outscored Houston 51-7 the rest of the way. (And if you don’t want to compare these 49ers to those Chiefs, consider that the 49ers averaged 29.4 points in Brock Purdy’s starts this season, while the 2019 Chiefs came in at 28.5 points in Mahomes’ full regular-season starts.)

Did Campbell (and/or offensive coordinator Ben Johnson) call the wrong play? I don’t think so. We’ve focused on the first fourth-down try. Goff was briefly pressured around left tackle Taylor Decker by Nick Bosa, but he stepped up in the pocket and found an open receiver in Reynolds. Goff was 0-for-8 when pressured in this game, but this should have been a completion. Reynolds just dropped what should have been a completion. That’s a good playcall, although the third-and-4 handoff to Amon-Ra St. Brown out of the backfield on the previous snap might have been cuter than necessary.

The fourth-and-3 in the fourth quarter was a great job by the San Francisco defense. The Lions used motion before the snap to get an indicator that the 49ers were in man coverage and dialed up a man-beating “mesh” pass concept, with two crossers and a wheel route. After the snap, though, the Niners were in zone. Goff was slowed down by not getting the look he expected, St. Brown and Sam LaPorta were knocked into one another, and the play broke down. Goff wasn’t able to create something out of structure, and the 49ers took over.

I’m not opposed to the idea of running the ball, especially on the fourth-and-2, but I’m guessing Goff had the ability to check into a run play if he got the right look. Detroit just had to execute, and it didn’t get the job done.

Did the first fourth-down failure turn the game toward the 49ers? It’s hard to argue against it feeling that way. The 49ers had already begun to get going on offense, but just about every big break went their way from that point forward. They scored two touchdowns to tie the game in a matter of minutes, with a Jahmyr Gibbs fumble helping hand them a short field.

There’s certainly correlation here, but can we say for sure the fourth-down failure did or did not cause the floodgates to open? It’s impossible to say. The Chiefs example above is why. That was a game in which the Texans had all the momentum, every break was going their way, Houston did the safe, traditional thing by kicking a field goal, and it didn’t matter. The Chiefs dominated the game from that moment forward, even before the Texans attempted a fake punt. Remember how the Chiefs turned things around late against the 49ers in the Super Bowl a few years ago, or how the Ravens got white-hot on offense in the second half after struggling against the Texans last week. Teams make drastic improvements during the game plenty of times without there being some rallying factor or easy storyline.

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Brandon Aiyuk follows up jaw-dropping catch with a TD

Brandon Aiyuk catches the deflected Brock Purdy pass off a Lions player, and a few plays later, he hauls in a touchdown.

If you want to argue the 49ers hit a little harder, or had some extra pep in their step, or felt a tiny bit better about their chances after the fourth-down stop, I won’t complain. What I will say, though, is the play that opened up this game and got the 49ers going is about as fluky and unlikely of a play as you can possibly imagine. Purdy threw up a 50-50 ball for Brandon Aiyuk, and Kindle Vildor appeared to bump Aiyuk and gained better position on the football for what should have been an interception. Instead, the ball bounced off his helmet and into the hands of Aiyuk, who caught it for a 51-yard gain. (The referees threw a flag downfield, so the interception might not have counted, but there was no announcement about a declined penalty after the play, per the NFL’s game book.)

For a second, pretend Campbell kicked the field goal to go up 17. What changes about this play? Does Vildor have more confidence up three scores and catch the pass? Does it fall harmlessly to the ground? Was the pressure of having to come up with a stop after a failed fourth-down so stressful that he tried to catch a pass with his facemask? Does Purdy not have as much of the wind under his sails and so he throws a shorter pass that is completed? The 49ers scored a touchdown three plays later.

If anything got the crowd going and seemed to turn the game, it was the pass off Vildor’s helmet as opposed to the fourth-down stuff. Gibbs fumbled while running a Crunch concept on the opening play of the next series, two players dove to the ground simultaneously to try to land on the ball, and Arik Armstead narrowly beat Kayode Awosika to the ball on the ground. It was a great play by Tashaun Gipson, who had struggled earlier in the game. Does he not make a great play if the Lions kick a field goal? Does Armstead not fall on the ball first?

The 49ers then drove four plays to score the game-tying touchdown, with a 21-yard Purdy scramble leading the way. The Lions got the ball back, and on a third-and-9, Goff found an open Reynolds for what should have been a first down, only for Reynolds to drop the ball. That first drop never happens if Campbell kicks the field goal, but the problem there isn’t being aggressive. It’s a wide receiver getting in his head after a drop that could just as easily have happened on first or second down.

The Lions punt. The 49ers march down the field with a big completion to George Kittle and a Purdy scramble and appear to be on their way to a lead-taking touchdown. And then, with no warning, the momentum stops. Purdy is sacked twice on consecutive plays, checks down on third-and-long, and the 49ers kick a field goal to go up three.

Suddenly, the same Lions who were thrown off by their failure on fourth down have remembered how to catch the ball and start thriving on offense. Their first play is a 22-yard completion to Jameson Williams where the ball bounces in the air before being dragged in. If it bounces into Ambry Thomas’s hands, it’s more proof the Lions are shook. Instead, it’s a completion. Montgomery runs for 16 yards. They are already in field goal range, pick up seven yards on third down, and then fail on fourth-and-3. If the 49ers had the momentum, where did it go to lead to the sacks? If the Lions gained it back, shouldn’t they have tried to ride the wave and go for it on fourth-and-3?

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Lions keep hopes alive with 4th-down TD in final minute

The Lions’ gamble on fourth down pays off as Jared Goff connects with Jameson Williams for a touchdown to bring Detroit within three points.

If anything, given that the 49ers had scored on the opening drive of the third quarter and already appeared to have some momentum on offense, shouldn’t we look back toward the final drive of the second quarter? Do you remember what happened there? For all of his audacity going for it on fourth down, Campbell faced a fourth-and-goal from the 2-yard line and decided to kick a field goal. As much as the three points would have come in handy from the fourth-down kick he passed up with a big lead, wouldn’t four more points from a touchdown have been even handier? ESPN’s model also had that decision at the end of the first half as a toss-up, so I’m not going to criticize Campbell for kicking.

So, it’s always right when a coach goes for it on fourth down, regardless of situation? No. It’s easy to feel analytics models are always recommending coaches go for it because of a selection bias; we don’t hear about those models in obvious situations where teams punt. And on the whole, coaches are still generally more conservative than the evidence suggests they should be, so we see way more plays in which coaches should be going for it and don’t than ones in which coaches should be punting and go for it instead.

What I’m struck by is how often we apply arguments to the side of being conservative and how rarely those arguments are used to justify being aggressive. Teams need to kick field goals before the fourth quarter to make a one-possession game a two-possession game or a two-score game a three-score one, but if a team’s trailing by two points before the extra point, that’s often derided as “too early” to go for a game-tying 2-pointer. Why should teams play to the score when they do the conservative, traditional move, but not the aggressive one?

Coaches are far more forward-thinking nowadays than they were when I first started regularly writing about their decisions nearly 15 years ago. Win expectancy models are better, both privately and publicly, than they were then. Throughout the season, I’ll hear plenty of coaches say why they were more conservative than what a model suggested because the model couldn’t incorporate something about the game. I’ll almost never hear a coach say a model said to punt but that they wanted to go for it because they were running over the opposing team up front, even though we should see hear that about as often if coaches are really paying attention to the evidence as opposed to merely finding excuses to be conservative.

For all the talk of what momentum the defense can get from coming up with a stop, doesn’t the offense get any momentum from converting? I didn’t hear a single person criticize the Ravens going for it on fourth-and-1 inside their own territory Sunday after they converted, even though they ran the risk of handing the Chiefs a short field with an early deficit. Nobody suggested Campbell was too aggressive when the Lions scored on fourth down in the prior two playoff games.

Did the Lions lose the game Sunday night because they didn’t get any points from those two situations? Of course. Three would have been better than zero. Three isn’t a guarantee, though, and seven is far better than three. They also lost because they gave up too many big plays in the passing game, allowed Purdy to break them with scrambles, weren’t able to get consistent pressure and stopped converting third-and-anything after an incredible run in the first half. They ran the ball 21 times for 148 yards in the first half and just eight times for 34 yards after the break.

Did Campbell’s decision hurt the Lions’ chances of winning and put them in an actively worse position? No. As the stages have grown bigger and bigger, he has continued to trust his players on the offensive side of the ball. Those decisions have generally paid off. He didn’t stop going for it in short yardage after the Lions failed on that 2-point conversion against the Cowboys in December and it probably won them a playoff game against the Rams. It helped win them the game against the Bucs last week. On Sunday, those decisions didn’t pay off. Campbell’s best chance of getting back to this spot next season — and advancing even further — is by continuing to stay aggressive when his team has a chance to score.