He has confounded analysts’ confident predictions that he would lift Ankara’s block on Sweden joining the alliance following Turkey’s presidential election, which he won in May, or certainly no later than NATO’s annual summit, which was in July. At that session, he pledged that Turkey would permit Sweden’s accession later this year. Two days later he changed his tune, saying that the Turkish parliament, where he holds sway, would need to sign off.
Mr. Erdogan’s obstructionism is contagious. It has apparently emboldened another problem child in NATO, Hungary. Having previously promised to back Sweden’s accession, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has threatened to impede it, irked at Stockholm’s criticism of his authoritarian ways.
As is often the case, given Mr. Erdogan’s transactional approach to international politics, there is a concession to be wrung before he agrees to open NATO’s doors to Sweden. He wants to finalize a deal to acquire $20 billion of U.S.-made F-16 fighters, along with modernization kits for the country’s aging fleet.
President Biden has backed the F-16 sale but made it clear to Mr. Erdogan that Congress has to sign off. And Mr. Biden’s influence in Congress is more limited than Mr. Erdogan’s in Turkey’s parliament. Members of Congress, who know how Mr. Erdogan operates, want Turkey’s hold on Sweden’s NATO membership definitively lifted before they will approve the full F-16 deal. Many of them are reluctant for the good reason that Turkey’s backsliding on democratic norms has accelerated. After meeting with Mr. Biden this month at the Group of 20 summit with major industrial nations, Mr. Erdogan expressed dismay, apparently without irony, that Mr. Biden was tying the F-16 package to Sweden.
The standoff is a bouquet for Russian President Vladimir Putin, with whom Mr. Erdogan has proclaimed he has a “special relationship.” The Turkish leader would be wise to reassess where his interests lie — with his NATO allies, whose combined economic output is roughly 10 times greater than Russia’s, or with the warmongers in the Kremlin, struggling to keep their economy in gear against the weight of Western sanctions.
The Western alliance would be significantly strengthened by Sweden’s entry, and Stockholm is understandably frustrated at the delay. It cast aside decades of formal neutrality to apply for NATO membership shortly after Russian troops invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Mindful of Mr. Erdogan’s stated objections to its joining the alliance, Stockholm has addressed Ankara’s concerns that it has failed to move aggressively against Kurds living in Sweden, whom Turkey considered terrorists. To that end, it has extradited several Kurds as requested by Turkey, and also modified its laws and constitution to permit tougher dealings with alleged terrorists. Last year, Stockholm also scrapped its arms embargo on Turkey.
Meanwhile, Sweden and NATO have tightened long-standing bonds even without formal membership. And in preparation for joining, Sweden has ramped up military outlays sharply to meet NATO’s target of spending 2 percent of annual gross domestic product on defense.
Mr. Erdogan is at risk of overplaying his hand. His efforts at horse-trading, in return for giving Sweden the nod on NATO, have included demanding progress toward Turkey joining the European Union and bullying Stockholm to legislate a formal ban on burning the Quran — an act of protest that has lately become more common. The former is a non-starter; the latter an affront to Stockholm’s tradition of freedom of expression.
His best option, and NATO’s, is to move forward with the deal that Mr. Biden and key members of Congress have signaled they are prepared to offer — the F-16 package once Turkey formally ratifies Sweden’s NATO membership.
