The same goes for its sister battalion the 249th South, the “Akhmat” Special Rapid Response Unit, the “Akhmat-Grozny Special Purpose Mobile Unit” and the “A A Kadyrov” Special Purpose Police Regiment.
In June, Kadyrov announced he would raise four more ethnic Chechen battalions to fight in Ukraine. In all, he probably commands in excess of 10,000 men.
If Putin dies or is severely weakened, Kadyrov’s loyalty may be tested. Some in Moscow, especially in the FSB, believe another Chechen rebellion is eventually inevitable.
Rumour has it he also maintains a heavily armed contingent at one of central Moscow’s larger hotels, an insurance policy to protect his interests in the capital.
In the event of Putin vanishing, they could act quickly – if not to install Kadyrov himself, then in favour of whichever faction or individual he chooses to back.
He is clearly strategic in his thinking. In Ukraine, his troops have been ridiculed as “TikTok” soldiers because of their fondness for self-promoting social media videos and a strange knack for avoiding any actual fighting.
But there is rationale for that, explains Galeotti: “Kadyrov is actually very careful with his fighters. These are the guys who ultimately keep him in power at home. So does he want them to go and die in Ukraine?”
They would also be outnumbered by the army, the FSB, and other parts of the national guard – and Kadyrov is universally feared and disliked.
Petrov is not sure that matters. “Prigozhin himself, even at the height of his popularity, wasn’t loved by the majority of Russians. Neither was Stalin when he began to take power. If there is a person who is decisive enough and capable enough to take power, it is another question to use state controlled media to make them popular.
“What the Wagner mutiny has demonstrated is that in an intra-elite fight, it is not necessarily the biggest military force that will dominate but the fastest one.”
